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By striking down the civil rights remedy of the 1994 Violence Against
Women Act in United States v. Morrison, the Supreme Court circum-
scribed Congress's power to enact federal civil rights laws punuant to either
the Commerce Clause or to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Julie
Goldscheid, coauthor of Petitioner Christy Bmzonkala's Brief to the Supreme
Court, argues that the Court's decision rested on an erroneous characteriza-
tion of the VAWA civil rights remedy. The Court analyzed the statute as one
regulating criminal conduct, rather than civil rights. Viewed as a ciil
rights statute, the law would not be subject to the Court's concerns about
disturbing the proper federal/state balnce, but instead reflects a carefully
tailored, proper exercise offederal legislative power.
t Julie Goldscheid, Senior Staff Attorney, NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund;
Adjunct Professor of Law, NewYork University School of Law. NOW Legal Defense rcpre-
sented Petitioner Christy Brzonkala before the Fourth Circuit in Brzonbala to. Wrginia Pty-
technic Institute & State Universiy 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999) (en banc), and the Supreme
Court in United States v. Aforison, 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000). No discussion of the Marrson
litigation would be complete without thanking the staff of the NOW Legal Defense and
Education Fund. In particular, I would like to thank tie following colleagues for their
invaluable assistance in preparing this Article: Staff Attorney Risa Kaufman, V1isiting Staff
Attorneys hMary Davis and Dina Bakst, Legal Interns Dawn Yuster, Nicole Lindemyer, and
SherriJayson, and Legal Assistant Taiwaan Harrison.
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The majority's approach calls into question Congress's ability to legis-
late both civil rights in general and gender-motivated violence in particular.
Ms. Goldscheid, however, points out the flaws in the majority's analysis
under the Commerce Clause. She details an alternative approach that would
recognize the legislation as a civil rights statute. Ms. Goldscheid also pro-
vides suggestions for ways in which Congress can revisit the legislation to
address Congress's concerns without violating the principles articulated in
Morrison. She concludes that VAWA was designed to remedy ongoing vio-
lations of distinct federal interests, thus clearly warranting federal civil
rights redress.
INTRODUCTION
In 1994, Congress took the historic step of recognizing that gen-
der-based violence can violate the victim's civil rights. It enacted a
civil rights remedy as part of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994
(VAWA)1 to provide redress for the resulting injuries.2 However, in
May 2000, the Supreme Court declared that law unconstitutional in
United States v. Morrison.3 The decision has been heralded as one of
the Court's most "sweeping" rulings in its newly restrictive view of con-
gressional power 4 and as a "resounding rebuke to Congress.", It fol-
lows on the heels of a series of decisions through which the Court has
cut back on the scope of federal legislative authority and the reach of
federal civil rights laws.6 These decisions raise questions about the
future of federal efforts to enact laws to redress civil rights in general
1 42 U.S.C. §§ 13931-14040 (1994).
2 Id. § 13981.
- United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000).
4 Linda Greenhouse, Women Lose Right to Sue Attackers in Federal Court, N.Y. TiMrEs, May
16, 2000, at Al.
5 Tony Mauro &Jonathan Ringel, Supreme Court Rejects VAWA Civil Lawsuits, N.Y. LJ.,
May 16, 2000, at 1.
6 See, e.g., Kimel v. Fl. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (striking private right of
action against states in federal court under Age Discrimination in Employment Act); Alden
v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (striking private right of action against states in state court
under Fair Labor Standards Act); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll.
Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (holding that Congress could not abrogate state sovereign
immunity from suit under federal patent law because that law was not constitutional exer-
cise of Congress's authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment); Printz v.
United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (striking Brady law requiring local jurisdictions to con-
duct background checks before handgun purchase); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507
(1997) (striking Religious Freedom Restoration Act as beyond the scope of Congress's
power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549 (1995) (striking Gun-free School Zones Act as beyond Congress's Commerce Clause
authority). Observers of the Court may have speculated about the result in Morrison based
on the timing of the Court's rulings. For example, Justice O'Connor announced the
Court's decision in Kimel that states could not be subject to suit under the federal Age
Discrimination in Employment Act on the morning of the Morrison oral argument. Morri-
son, 120 S. Ct. at 1740; Kimel 528 U.S. at 62.
UNITED STATES v. MORRISON
as well as Congress's authority to legislate against gender-motivated
violence.7
Congress enacted the civil rights remedy based on its authority
under both the Commerce Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.8 The Morrison decision offers a limited discussion of the
Court's rationale for striking the statute on both constitutional bases.
However, the decision established that Congress cannot enact laws
under the Commerce Clause that regulate noneconomic, violent
criminal conduct based only on the conduct's aggregate effect on in-
terstate commerce. 9 The decision also casts doubt on Congress's Sec-
tion 5 authority to enact remedial federal legislation that regulates the
conduct of private individuals. 10
The decision makes dear the majority's concern about preserving
"the Constitution's distinction between national and local author-
ity."" Whether or not one agrees with the Court's insistence on the
limited role of the federal government, the Rehnquist Court's concep-
tion of limited federal power is not the only workable approach. Vari-
ous scholars have proposed analytic frameworks for preserving the
limited role of the federal government with respect to the states, while
also taking into account the realities of our modem economy.'2
While the Morrison decision can be criticized from many perspec-
tives, this Article will focus on an aspect of Commerce Clause analysis
that the majority does not address-an aspect that could have pro-
vided a basis for upholding the law and that could provide a basis for
analyzing similar laws, even under the Morrison Court's limited con-
ception of federal power. The majority failed to take into account
that, in enacting the VAWA civil rights remedy, Congress created a
new civil rights law. From a civil rights perspective, it is apparent that
7 For example, Senator Joseph Biden stated-
To be very blunt about it, [the decision] is going to have a lot less impact
on violence against women than on the role of the U.S. Congress in future
issues .... The ruling is really about power-whether the court or Congress
will determine whether a particular activity has an effect on interstate
commerce.
Richard Willing, Justices Address 11w Has Right To Regulate Conduc, USA TODA May 16,
2000, at 6A (alteration in original).
8 H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 103-711, at 385 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1839,
1853.
9 Morrison, 120 S. C. at 1754.
10 Id. at 1758-59.
11 Id. at 1752.
12 See, ag., Ann Althouse, Tloretical and Constitutional Issues: Enfordng Federalism after
United States v. Lopez, 38 Amz. L Rrv. 793 (1996) (proposing evaluation of the benefits of
federal versus state regulation); Envin Chemerinsky, Theories of Federalism: Federalism No as
Limits, But as Empowermen 45 U. KAN. L REv. 1219 (1997) (proposing federalism doctrine
based on functions of federal and state governments); Vicki C.Jaclkson, Federalism and the
Uses andLimits of Law: Printz andPiniple, 111 HAtv. L REv. 2180 (1998) (urging a flexi-
ble and practical approach to evaluating scope of federal power).
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the law covers a limited universe-discriminatory conduct-in which
the federal government has a strong and historic national interest.
Nowhere does the majority acknowledge that the law Congress en-
acted regulated discrimination and was therefore distinct in nature
from a statute that authorizes wholesale federal regulation of criminal
or family law. Had the Court analyzed the statute as civil rights legisla-
tion, it should have upheld the VAWA civil rights remedy as within the
realm of traditional federal power.
To provide historical context, Part I of this Article will briefly re-
view the legislative history that preceded the law's enactment. Part II
will summarize the facts of the Morrison case to provide the back-
ground from which the decision arose. Part III will review the Su-
preme Court's decision in Morrison, examining the Court's reasoning
for striking down the statute under both the Commerce Clause and
Section 5. Part IV will contrast the Court's reasoning with an alterna-
tive analysis of the VAWA civil rights remedy as an exercise of Con-
gress's Commerce Clause power to regulate civil rights violations that
impact interstate commerce. Part V will conclude by examining the
scope of possible future federal legislation addressing gender-moti-
vated crimes in the aftermath of Morrison.
I
THE VAWA CIvn. RIGHTS REMEDY'S LEGISLATIVE HISTORY13
In considering the civil rights remedy's constitutionality, the
Court had before it an extensive legislative record demonstrating that
the law was aimed at eradicating a particularly pernicious form of dis-
crimination. Congress enacted the Violence Against Women Act of
1994,14 after more than four years of congressional deliberation,
which included nine hearings with more than a hundred witnesses
submitting testimony.' 5 Through these proceedings, Congress ex-
13 This legislative history was presented to the Court in Petitioner Christy Brzonkala's
Brief, which this author drafted along with the following colleagues: Martha F. Davis and
Risa Kaufman at NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund; Carter Phillips, Richard
Bernstein, Katherine Adams, Jacqueline Cooper, Faith Gay, and Paul Hemrnmersbaugh of
Sidley & Austin; and Professor Cass Sunstein. Brief of Petitioner Christy Brzonkala at 6-18,
Morrison (Nos. 99-5, 99-29).
14 Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902 (codified in scattered sections of 8, 16, 18, 28, &
42 U.S.C.).
15 Domestic Violence: Not Just a Family Matter:. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime and
Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. (1994); Crimes of Violence
Motivated by Gender: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. (1993) [hereinafter 1993 Crimes of Violence Hearing];
Violence Against Women: Fighting the Fear: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciay, 103d
Cong. (1993) [hereinafter 1993 Violence Against Women Hearing]; Violent Crimes Against Wo-
men: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. (1993) [hereinafter 1993
Violent Crimes Hearing]; Hearing on Domestic Violence Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
103d Cong. (1993) [hereinafter 1993 Domestic Violence Hearing]; Violence Against Women:
[Vol. 86:109
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haustively explored the problem of violence against women, a prob-
lem that Congress termed "a national tragedy played out every day in
the lives of millions of American women at home, in the workplace,
and on the street."16 Congress devised a multistrategic legislative re-
sponse, including many provisions other than the civil rights law at
issue in Morison. For example, VAWA has provided 1.6 billion dollars
over six years to fund a range of programs,17 including new initiatives
to improve law enforcement's response to crimes such as domestic
violence and sexual assault, to improve victim services, and to create a
national domestic violence hotline.18 VAWA has also created new fed-
eral felonies to address acts of interstate domestic violence' 9 and re-
quires all states to give full faith and credit to protection orders issued
by other states.20 It contains important provisions to assist battered
immigrant women in obtaining legal citizenship status without requir-
ing the cooperation of abusive partners, who, as part of the cycle of
abuse, frequently frustrate the women's efforts to obtain legal citizen-
ship.21 The comprehensive legislation also includes research provi-
sions to advance our national understanding of the problem.2
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Cime and CiminaliJuslice of the House Comm. on theJudiday,
102d Cong. (1992) [hereinafter 1992 Hearing]; Violence Against Il'ome=: ,ictims of the System:
Hearing on S. 15 Before the Senate Comm. on theJudidaiy, 102d Cong. (1991) [hereinafter 1991
Hearing]; Women and Violence: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judimy, 101st Cong.
(1990) [hereinafter 1990 Women and Violence Hearing]; Domestic iolenm: Terrorism in the
Home: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on CldLdren, Family, Drugs and Alcoholism of the Senate Comm.
on Labor and Human Res., 101st Cong. (1990) [hereinafter 1990 Domestic Violence Hearing].
For a summary of these hearings, see Brief of Amid Curiae SenatorJoseph R. Biden,Jr. in
Support of Petitioners at 7-15, 20-28, Morrison (Nos. 99-5, 99-29); Motion for Leave to File
Brief Amid Curiae and Brief of Amid Curiae Equal Rights Advocates, et al. in Support of
Petitioners passim, Morrison (Nos. 99-5, 99-29); SenatorJoseph R. Biden,Jr., The Civil Rights
Remedy of the Violence Against Women Act A Defense 37 HARv.J. oN-; LE. 1, 2-6 (2000); Sally F.
Goldfarb, ViolenceAgainst Women and the Pemistence of Pivaqy, 61 Otno ST. LJ. 1, 45-51, 6065
(2000); Victoria F. Nourse, Where Violenc, Relationship, and Equaliy Mfeet: The VioleneAgainst
Women Act's Civil Rights Remedy, 11 Wis. WoMiEN's L.J. 1, 18-23 (1996).
16 S. REP. No. 102-197, at 39 (1991).
17 Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L No. 103-322, 109 Stat. 1902 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 8, 16, 18, 28, & 42 U.S.C.).
18 Violence Against Women Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. §§ 13991-94 (1995) (providing
funding for training of judges and court personnel in state courts); §§ 14001-02 (provid-
ing similar funding for federal judges and court personnel); § 300w-10 (authorizing fund-
ing to states for rape prevention and education); § 10416 (authorizing funding for a
national hotline for domestic violence victims).
19 Violence Against Women Act § 40221, 108 Stat. at 1926-28 (codified as amended at
18 U.S.C. §§ 2261-62 (1994)).
20 Id, 108 Stat. at 1930-31 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2265).
21 Id. sec. 40701, §§ 204(a) (1) to (2), 108 Stat. at 1953-55 (codified as amended at 8
U.S.C. §§ 1154(a) (1) (A) to (B) (1999); id. sec. 40702, § 216(c) (4), 108 Stat. at 1955 (codi-
fied as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1986a(c) (4)); id. sec. 40703, § 244(a), 108 Stat. at 1955
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. 1254).
22 42 U.S.C. §§ 13961-63, 14192-93.
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The civil rights remedy23 was the subject of much debate before
its ultimate enactment.2 4 Some might suggest that ChiefJustice Rehn-
quist's public pronouncements opposing the law stacked the deck
against its survival. 25 Nevertheless, the law was enacted after careful
legislative review.2 6 In its final form, the law declared that "[a]ll per-
sons within the United States shall have the right to be free from
crimes of violence motivated by gender"27 and created a private cause
of action against any "person .. .who commits a crime of violence
motivated by gender.128 Plaintiffs had to establish two primary ele-
ments of proof: first, that the act was a "crime of violence" as the stat-
ute defined that term29 and, second, that the act was gender-
motivated.30 The civil rights remedy permitted recovery of compensa-
tory and punitive damages and other forms of relief.31 The law mir-
23 Id. § 13981.
24 Supra note 15 (listing relevant hearings). See generally Nourse, supra note 15, passim
(narrating VAWA's legislative history).
25 138 CONG. REc. E746 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1992) (statement of Sen. Smith) (quoting
remarks of ChiefJustice Rehnquist); cf 1993 Crimes of Violence Hearing, supra note 15, at 75-
76 (containing the Report of the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United
States, Sept. 23-24, 1991, expressing opposition to the civil rights remedy and federal felo-
nies for interstate domestic violence); 1991 Hearing, supra note 15, at 315 (statement by
Conference of ChiefJustices) (opposing civil rights remedy because it would "cause major
state-federal jurisdictional problems and disruptions in the processing of domestic rela-
tions cases in state courts").
26 See generally Nourse, supra note 15 (discussing VAWA's legislative history).
27 42 U.S.C. § 13981(b).
28 Id. § 13981(c). Although gender-motivated violence disproportionately affects wo-
men, the law was drafted in gender-neutral terms. S. REP. No. 103-138, at 37-38 (1993).
29 VAWA defines a "crime of violence" as an act or acts that would constitute a felony
under existing federal or state law, "whether or not those acts have actually resulted in
criminal charges, prosecution, or conviction." 42 U.S.C. § 13981(d) (2) (A).
30 A crime is "motivated by gender" if it is "committed because of gender or on the
basis of gender, and due, at least in part, to an animus based on the victim's gender." Id.
§ 13981(d) (1). This Article will focus on the law's constitutionality and will not address
the interpretation of its statutory elements. For a discussion of the meaning of "gender-
motivation" under the law, see Julie Goldscheid, Gender-Motivated Violence: Developing a
Meaningful Paradigm for Civil Rights Enforcement, 22 HARV. WOMEN's L.J. 123 (1999).
31 42 U.S.C. § 13981(c) (authorizing compensatory and punitive damages as well as
injunctive and declaratory relief). In addition, a four-year limitations period applies to
VAWA civil rights claims under the federal "catch all" for civil rights remedy claims. See 28
U.S.C. § 1658 (1994); Grace v. Thomason Nissan, 76 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1090 (D. Or. 1999)
(applying four-year federal catch-all statute of limitations to VAWA civil rights remedy
claim); see also DAVID FRAZEE Er AL., VIOLENcE AGAINST WOMEN LAW AND LITIGATION § 11:22
(1998) (stating that 28 U.S.C. § 1658 applies to VAWA claims); Lisa Barr&Quick & Shan-
non Matthew Kasley, The Road Less Traveled: Obstacles in the Path of the Effective Use of the Civil
Rights Provision of the Violence Against Women Act in the Employment Context, 8 SETroN HALL
CONsT. LJ. 415, 431 & n.61 (1998) (same); Betty Levinson, The Civil Rights Remedy of the
Violence Against Women Act: Legislative History, Policy Implications and Litigation Strategy, 4 J.L.
& POL'Y 401, 407-08 n.41 (1996) (same). By contrast, the limitations period in state inten-
tional tort cases is frequently much shorter. LEONARD KARP & CHERt L. KAWu, DOrESTC
ToRTs: FAMILY VIOLENCE, CoNFLIcT AND SEXuAL ABUSE § 1.31 & app. B (Supp. 1999).
UNITED STATES v. MORRISON
rored other federal civil fights laws that authorize recovery of damages
upon circumstantial proof that the act was discriminatory.32
The civil rights remedy contained other provisions that reflected
Congress's attempt to situate the law squarely within the realm of ac-
ceptable federal legislation. For example, addressing concerns raised
by the Conference of ChiefJustices and the Judicial Conference of the
United States, Congress expressly limited the civil rights remedy so
that it would reach only conduct that was already unlawful, would not
interfere with the enforcement of existing state criminal and civil laws,
and would preserve a proper role for state courts.3 3 The remedy ex-
cluded any cause of action for "random acts of violence unrelated to
gender or for acts that cannot be demonstrated, by a preponderance
of the evidence, to be motivated by gender."34 It further prohibited
federal courts from asserting supplemental jurisdiction over claims for
"divorce, alimony, equitable distribution of marital property, or child
custody decree[s]." 35 In addition, it permitted plaintiffs to bring civil
rights remedy claims in either federal or state court36 and also prohib-
ited removal of actions filed in state court 37 As Senator Hatch ex-
plained, the civil rights remedy "take[s] into consideration the role of
the Federal Government versus the role of the State[s]."33
Congress dearly articulated its intent to create a "civil rights"
cause of action for victims of crimes of violence motivated by gen-
der.39 It did so after hearing voluminous testimony both about the
ways violence against women interferes with women's full participa-
tion in the economy and about the discriminatory manner in which
states have treated gender-based crimes. Because the legislative re-
32 Congress specifically drew the analogy to other forms of civil rights laws. It di-
rected courts to draw on the type of circumstantial evidence used to prove discrimination
in cases involving discrimination at work, Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2000e-17, civil rights violations committed by state actors, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, or
analogous damages actions based on conspiracies to violate an individual's civil rights,
which encompass damages recovery for acts of bias-motivated violence committed by more
than one person, 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).
33 After Congress made these changes, theJudicial Conference ithdrew its opposi-
tion. 1993 Cimes of Violenze Hearing, supra note 15, at 70-71 (Letter from Stanley Marcus,
Chairman, Ad Hoc Committee on Gender-Based Violence for the Judicial Conference).
The National Association of Women Judges consistently endorsed VAWA, including the
civil rights remedy, beginning in 1992. Id. at 30-32 (statement of the Honorable Judith
Billings, President of the National Association of Women Judges).
34 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (e) (1).
35 Id. § 13981(e) (4).
36 Id. § 13981 (e) (3).
37 28 U.S.C. § 1445(d) (1994 & West Supp. 2000).
38 1993 Violent Cimes Heaing; supra note 15, at 81 (statement of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch).
39 42 U.S.C. § 13981(a).
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cord has been summarized elsewhere, it will only briefly be reviewed
here.40
A. Commerce Clause
Congress based the exercise of its Commerce Clause authority on
substantial testimony about the specific ways gender-based violence,
such as domestic violence, sexual assault, and stalking, impacts wo-
men's economic choices. In the 1994 Conference Report preceding
the law's enactment, Congress summarized its findings that gender-
motivated violence has pervasive effects on interstate commerce
by deterring potential victims from traveling interstate, from engag-
ing in employment in interstate business, and from transacting with
business, and in places involved, in interstate commerce;... by di-
minishing national productivity, increasing medical and other costs,
and decreasing the supply of and the demand for interstate prod-
ucts; a Federal civil rights action ... is necessary... to reduce the
substantial adverse effects on interstate commerce caused by crimes
of violence motivated by gender .... 41
Notwithstanding the Mortison Court's ultimate rejection of Congress's
Commerce Clause authority to enact the civil rights remedy, the Court
recognized the "serious impact" of gender-based violence Congress
detailed. 42 The legislative record detailed the effect of gender-based
violence on women's employment, educational opportunities, and
overall economic status. To give just a few examples, the record docu-
ments that almost fifty percent of rape victims lose their jobs or are
forced to quit as a consequence of the crime and that the fear of gen-
der-based violence deters women from taking jobs in certain areas or
during hours that pose a significant risk of such violence. 43 Witness
40 For additional summaries of the legislative history, see, for example, Brief of Andcus
Curiae SenatorJoseph R. Biden,Jr. in Support of Petitioners at 7-15, 20-28, United States v.
Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000) (No. 99-5, 99-29); Motion for Leave to File Brief Amid
Curiae and Brief of Amid Curiae Equal Rights Advocates et al. in Support of Petitioners
passim, Morrison (No. 99-5, 99-29); Goldfarb, supra note 15; Nourse, supra note 15.
41 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 103-711, at 385 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1839,
1853; see also S. REP. No. 103-117, at 54 (1993) ("Gender-based crimes and the fear of
gender-based crimes restricts movement, reduces employment opportunities, increases
health expenditures, and reduces consumer spending, all of which affect interstate com-
merce and the national economy."); S. REP. No. 102-197, at 53 (1991) (same).
42 Moron, 120 S. Ct. at 1752.
43 Congress found that women justifiably "refuse higher paying nightjobs in service/
retail industries because of the fear of attack" and noted that homicide is the leading cause
of women's death at work. S. REP. No. 103-138, at 54 n.70 (1993); see also S. REP. No. 102-
197, at 38 ("[N]early 50 percent [of women] do not use public transit alone after dark" for
fear of rape.); id. (noting that fear of violence "takes a substantial toll on the lives of all
women," for example, "in lost work").
[Vol. 86:109
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accounts detailed how batterers often prevent or interfere with their
partners' jobs.44
Looking outside the workplace, Congress found that gender-mo-
tivated violence can force victims into poverty, forcing them to seek
support from government benefits and social services. 45 Additional ev-
idence revealed that violence against women gives rise to significant
health care and government expenditures as well as other costs that
affect the economy at large.46
Particularly relevant to the claim before the Morrison Court, Con-
gress found that the "devastation" and potential economic and em-
ployment effects of gender-motivated violence are "often magnified
for young women attending college."47 Congress observed that it is
not unusual for many student victims to "drop out of school alto-
gether . . . [or] interrupt [their] college career[s] simply to avoid
[their] attacker[s]. " 48
B. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
A similarly detailed legislative record supported Congress's con-
dusion that it had authority to enact the law under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment-49 Congress made extensive findings that
States had discriminated in their treatment of gender-based crimes.
For example, Congress expressly stated that
State and Federal criminal laws do not adequately protect against
the bias element of crimes of violence motivated by gender, which
separates these crimes from acts of random violence, nor do these
adequately provide victims of gender-motivated crimes the opportu-
44 1993 Domestic Violence Hearing, supra note 15, at 17-18 (statement ofJames Harde-
man, Manager, Counseling Department, Polaroid Corp.) (detailing impact of domestic
violence on businesses' bottom line, including attendance, performance, and increased
medical claims); 1991 Hearing, supra note 15, at 235, 240 (statement of National Federation
of Business and Professional Women) (noting that harassment by batterers 'reducc[s] bat-
tered women's ability to maintain or secure employment"); S. RE'. No. 101-545, at 33
(1990) (noting that gender-motivated violence causes "lost careers, decreased productiv-
ity"); id. at 37 (noting that gender-motivated violence "takes its toll in employee absentee-
ism and sick time for women who either cannot leave their homes or are afraid to show the
physical effects of the violence").
45 ERg., S. REP'. No. 101-545, at 37 ("[A]s many as 50 percent of homeless women and
children are fleeing domestic violence.").
46 S. REP. No. 103-138, at 41; see also S. REP. No. 101-545, at 33 ("Partial estimates show
that violent crime against women costs this country at least 3 billion-not million, but
billion-dollars a year." (emphasis added)).
47 S. REP. No. 101-545, at 44; see also 1993 Vioknce Against Women Hearing, supra note
15, at 41 (statement ofJennifer Tescher) (victim testimony recounting lost concentration
and interest in school after sexual assault on campus); S. Rn'. No. 102-197, at 62 ("[R]ape
on campus is widespread and poses a grave threat not only to students' physical well-being
but also to their educational opportunities.").
48 S. REP. No. 101-545, at 44.
49 U.S. CoNsr. amend XIV, § 5.
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nity to vindicate their interests; existing bias and discrimination in
the criminal justice system often deprives victims of crimes of vio-
lence motivated by gender of equal protection of the laws and the
redress to which they are entitled; ... a Federal civil rights action as
specified in this section is necessary to guarantee equal protection
of the laws... and the victims of crimes of violence motivated by
gender have a right to equal protection of the laws, including a sys-
tem of justice that is unaffected by bias or discrimination and that,
at every relevant stage, treats such crimes as seriously as other vio-
lent crimes.50
Congress based this conclusion on evidence of systemic discrimi-
nation against victims of gender-motivated violence embodied in for-
mal and informal legal barriers to civil and criminal suits and rooted
in a long history of discriminatory treatment. For example, as of 1990,
seven states still did not permit prosecutions of marital rape; twenty-
six additional states allowed marital rape prosecutions only under lim-
ited circumstances, such as when there is evidence of physical injury;
numerous other states limited prosecutions of cohabitants or dating
companions. 51 Ten states still formally barred women from bringing
tort actions against their abusive husbands.52 State laws limiting rape
shield provisions to criminal prosecutions exposed women bringing
tort actions for sexual assault to intrusive questioning about consen-
sual sexual activity unrelated to the attack.53 Further, although almost
every state had enacted hate crime legislation, less than a dozen cov-
ered gender bias.54
Congress also found systemic discrimination reflected in a host of
informal, but entrenched, discriminatory practices.- Reviewing
states' own gender bias task force reports, Congress noted that,
"[s]tudy after study commissioned by the highest courts of the
States-from Florida to New York, California to NewJersey, Nevada to
Minnesota--has concluded that crimes disproportionately affecting
women are often treated less seriously than comparable crimes against
50 H.R CoNF. REP. No. 103-711, at 385-86 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1839,
1853-59; see also, e.g., S. REP. No. 103-138, at 55 (stating that the Act "provides a necessary
remedy to fill the gaps and rectify the biases of existing State laws").
51 S. REp. No. 103-138, at 42; S. REp. No. 102-197, at 45 & nn.49-50, 54; S. REP. No.
101-545, at 41 n.78.
52 1990 Women and Violence Heaing, supra note 15, pt. 1, at 62, 64 (statement of Helen
Neuborne, Executive Director, NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund).
53 E.g., S. REP. No. 102-197, at 46 (citing Iowa civil case in which judge permitted
questioning about victim's "sex life after the rape," her use of birth control, and her "repu-
tation of having %wild parties'").
54 S. REP. No. 103-138, at 48 n.47.
55 Id. at 42 ("[C]rimes against women are often treated differently and less seriously
than other crimes.").
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men."56 For example, "[p]olice may refuse to take reports; prosecu-
tors may encourage defendants to plead to minor offenses; judges
may rule against victims on evidentiary matters; and juries too often
focus on the behavior of the survivors-laying blame on the victims
instead of on the attackers."57 Discriminatory practices reduced the
number of rape cases that resulted in arrest and increased the likeli-
hood that the trial court would dismiss the case.5 8 In sum, Congress
concluded that these discriminatory practices preclude redress for a
large proportion of victims of gender-motivated violence.
C. States' Support for the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy
Unlike the history of many other laws, the legislative record pre-
ceding enactment of the civil rights remedy documented states' can-
did acknowledgment that they were unable alone to provide adequate
remedies to victims of gender-motivated violence.r 9 Much of the legis-
lative evidence of the states' institutional discrimination came directly
from reports prepared by state courts and submitted for Congress's
consideration.60 Perhaps most striking is that forty-one state attome)s
general from thirty-eight states, the District of Columbia, and two
56 S. REP. No. 120-197, at 43; see also S. REP. No. 101-545, at 33-34, 41 (describing
studies that portray the "double-victimization" of women who have been raped).
57 S. REP. No. 103-138, at 42; see also 1991 Hearing, supra note 15, at 135-36 (testimony
of Gill Freeman, Chair, Florida Supreme Court Gender Bias Study Implementation Com-
mittee) (citing examples of state court judges' gender bias, including ajudge's comment
to a convicted rapist that he should learn to "'take the women out to dinner first, like the
rest of us'"); S. REP. No. 103-138, at 41 (citing Washington, D.C. study finding that, in
eighty-five percent of cases where police found a woman bleeding, they failed to arrest her
attacker); id at 44 ("State remedies are inadequate to fight bias crimes against
women. .. ").
58 For example, Congress found that
[O]ver 60 percent of rape reports do not result in arrests; and a rape case is
more than twice as likely to be dismissed as a murder case and nearly 40
percent more likely to be dismissed than a robbery case. Less than half of
the individuals arrested for rape are convicted of rape. In comparison, 69
percent of those arrested for murder are convicted of murder, and 61 per-
cent of those arrested for robbery are convicted of robbery. Finally, over
one-half of all convicted rapists serve an average of only 1 year or less in
prison.
S. REP. No. 103-138, at 42 (footnotes omitted); see also id. at 38 ("Almost one-quarter of
convicted rapists never go to prison and another quarter received sentences in local jails
where the average sentence is 11 months.").
59 Eg., 1993 Domestic Violence Hearing, supra note 15, at 4 (statement of Sarah M. Buel,
Director, Domestic Violence Unit, District Attorney's Office, Suffolk County, Massachu-
setts); 1993 VItolent Crimes Hearing, supra note 15, at 33-35 (statement of Kimberly Hornak,
Salt Lake County Attorney's Office); 1992 Hearing, supra note 15, at 70, 75 (statement of
Mfargaret Rosenbaum, Assistant State Attorney, Miami, Florida); id. at 85, 86 (statement of
Guy Pfeiffer, Chief Niagistrate of Crisp City, Georgia); 1991 Hearing, supra note 15, at 28, 33
(statement of Bonnie Campbell, Iowa Attorney General); id. at 65, 66 (statement of Roland
Burris, Illinois, Attorney General); 1990 Domestic Violence Hearing, supra note 15, at 90-93.
60 S. REP. No. 103-138, at 45 n.29, 46 n.35, 49 n.52 (citing numerous state task force
reports); STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON TM JUDICIARY, 103t Co.,G., THE REsPOSE To RAPE:
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United States territories urged Congress to enact the civil rights rem-
edy, stating that
the current system for dealing with violence against women is inade-
quate. Our experience as Attorneys General strengthens our belief
that the problem of violence against women is a national one, re-
quiring federal attention, federal leadership and federal funds.
[VAWA] would begin to meet those needs by, inter alia, . . . creating
a specific federal civil rights remedy for the victims of gender-based
crimes .... 61
Consistent with the states' views during the legislative process, nearly
three-quarters of the states joined a brief urging the Court to uphold
the law.62
II
CHmRs-y BPzoNKALA's CLAIMS
The Morrison case involved a facial challenge to the constitution-
ality of the civil rights remedy. However, the underlying facts warrant
brief review because they offer an example of the types of claims
brought under the civil rights remedy.63 Christy Brzonkala sought re-
dress for the damages she suffered after two students gang-raped her
in her college dorm shortly after she enrolled as a freshman at Vir-
ginia Polytechnic Institute ("Virginia Tech").6 As set forth in her
DETouRs ON THE ROAD TO EQuALJusTICE 5 n.7 (Comm. Print 1993) (same); S. REP. No.
102-197, at 43-44 & n.40 (same).
61 1993 Crimes of Violence Hearing, supra note 15, at 34-36 (letter from Robert Abrams,
Attorney General of New York) (presenting letter signed by thirty-seven attorneys general
and supported by an additional four state attorneys general); accord 1991 Hearing, supra
note 15, at 37-39 (Resolution adopted by the National Association of Attorneys General)
(unanimously urging VAWA's passage).
62 Brief of Amici Curiae State of Arizona, et al. in Support of Petitioners, United States
v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000) (No. 99-5, 99-29).
63 Many VAWA civil rights remedy claims involved gender-based violence that inter-
fered with women's employment or education. E.g., Burgess v. Cahall, 88 F. Supp. 2d 319
(D. Del. 2000) (involving employment); Ericson v. Syracuse Univ., 45 F. Supp. 2d 344
(S.D.N.Y. 1999) (involving education); Liu v. Striuli, 36 F. Supp. 2d 452 (D.R.I. 1999) (in-
volving education); Anisimov v. Lake, 982 F. Supp. 531 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (involving employ.
ment); see also Brief of Amid Curiae Law Professors in Support of Petitioners at 18 n.18,
Morrison, (No. 99-5, 99-29) (categorizing claims).
64 Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1745-46. The Morrison case originally was captioned Brzonhala
v. Virginia Polytechnic Institute reflecting the original claim brought by Christy Brzonkala
against Virginia Tech under Title IX and against defendants Antonio Morrison andJames
Crawford under the VAWA civil rights remedy. Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State
Univ., 935 F. Supp. 772 (W.D. Va. 1996). The parties settled the Title IX claim after the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the school's discriminatory response to the
alleged gang rape could be actionable under Title IX. Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. &
State Univ., 169 F.3d 820, 827 n.2 (4th Cir. 1999) (en banc). The caption changed to
United States v. Morrison, Bizonkala v. Morrison when the case reached the U.S. Supreme
Court, reflecting the fact that the Court Clerk docketed the United States's petition for
certiorari first.
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pleadings, Brzonkala alleged that she was raped by defendants
Antonio Morrison and James Crawford, Virginia Tech students and
members of the school's varsity football team.6 5 Thirty minutes after
she met them, Morrison and Crawford raped her on a dormitory bed,
disrobing her and forcing her to submit to unvanted vaginal inter-
course three times while they pinned her down.66 After the third
rape, Morrison threatened Brzonkala by stating "you better not have
any fucking diseases."67 After finally releasing her, Morrison stalked
Brzonkala, following her until she reached her dormitory room.6
Morrison made other comments after the assault that caused the
lower courts to conclude that the rapes were "gender-motivated" as
defined under the remedy.69 For example, Morrison announced pub-
licly in the dormitory dining hall that he "like[d] to get girls drunk
and fuck the shit out of them."70 After Brzonkala filed a complaint
with the school alleging a violation of Virginia Tech's sexual assault
policy, she learned that another male student-athlete had been over-
heard telling Crawford that he should have "killed the bitch."7'
As a result of the sexual assaults, Brzonkala became depressed,
stopped attending classes, and attempted to commit suicide.72 She
received psychiatric treatment, but the rape had rendered her unable
to continue her education.73 She withdrew from Virginia Tech.74
Christy Brzonkala filed suit in federal court against Morrison and
Crawford under the civil rights remedy and against Virginia Tech
under Title IX.5 After the defendants challenged the law's constitu-
tionality, the United States intervened to defend the law. The district
court held that Brzonkala's complaint stated a civil rights remedy
claim 7 6 but struck down the law as beyond Congress's authority under
both the Commerce Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.7 7 A panel of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the
65 Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 174546.
66 Id. at 1746.
67 Id.
68 Pl.'s Am. CompL. 23, Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. 772 (No. 95-1358-R).
69 Morriso4 120 S. Ct. at 1747; Brzonkala, 169 F.3d at 829-31; Brzonkala v. Va. PolYtech-
nic Inst. & State Univ., 132 F.3d 949, 963-64 (4th Cir. 1997); Bzonlala, 935 F. Supp. at 784-
85.
70 Brzonkala, 169 F.3d at 827, 830.
71 Brzonkala, 132 F.3d at 954; Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 775, 778.
72 Bzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 774.
7-3 Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1746.
74 Id.
75 Id The Fourth Cricuit en banc upheld the Title IX claim which ultimately settled.
Brzonkala, 169 F.3d at 827 n.2 (vacating district court's dismissal and remanding Title IX
claim); see also Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., No. 95-1358 (W.D. Va. Mar.
20, 2000) (order dismissing action without prejudice as to Virginia Tech).
76 Brzonkdla, 935 F. Supp. at 785.
77 Id. at 793, 800.
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statute as a valid exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause power,78
but the Fourth Circuit reversed that decision after rehearing by the en
banc court. 79 In contrast to the decisions in this case, virtually every
other court to address the question had upheld the law's
constitutionality.8 0
III
TiE MoRwsoN DECISION
A. The Court's Commerce Clause Analysis
The Morrison Court struck down the VAWA civil rights remedy as
beyond Congress's power under both the Commerce Clause and Sec-
tion 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The law's constitutionality
under the Commerce Clause was challenged after the Court's deci-
sion in United States v. Lopez, which invalidated a federal law prohibit-
ing gun possession near schools.8' The Lopez decision marked the
first time in sixty years that the Court invalidated Congress's exercise
of its Commerce Clause power.8 2 Like Lopez, the question before the
Court in Morrison was whether the law fell beyond Congress's Com-
merce Clause power, which authorized Congress to regulate activities
"having a substantial relation" to, or that "substantially affect," inter-
state commerce.83
78 Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 132 F.3d 949, 964-74 (4th Cir.
1997).
79 Brzonkala, 169 F.3d at 831-62.
80 E.g., Williams v. Bd. of County Comm'r, No. 98-2485-JTM, 1999 U.S. Dist, LEXIS
13532 (D. Kan. Aug. 24, 1999); Kuhn v. Kuhn, No. 98-C-2395, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11010
(N.D. Ill. July 14, 1999); Culberson v. Doan, 65 F. Supp. 2d 701 (S.D. Ohio 1999); Ericson
v. Syracuse Univ., 45 F. Supp. 2d 344 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Doe v. Mercer, 37 F. Supp. 2d 64 (D.
Mass.), rev'd on other grounds, 193 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 1999); Liu v. Striuli, 36 F. Supp. 2d 452
(D.R.I. 1999); C.R.K. v. Martin, No. 96-1431-MLB, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22309 (D. Kan,
Oct. 27, 1998); Ziegler v. Ziegler, 28 F. Supp. 2d 601 (E.D. Wash. 1998); Mattison v. Click
Corp., No. 97-CV-2736, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 720 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 27, 1998); Crisonino v.
New York City Hous. Auth., 985 F. Supp. 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Anisimov v. Lake, 982 F.
Supp. 531 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Seaton v. Seaton, 971 F. Supp. 1188 (D. Tenn. 1997); Doe v.
Hartz, 970 F. Supp. 1375 (N.D. Iowa 1997), rev'd on other grounds, 134 F.3d 1339 (8th Cir.
1998); Doe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608 (D. Conn. 1996). But see Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic
Inst. & State Univ., 169 F. 3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999) (en banc), affd sub nom. United States v.
Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000); Bergeron v. Bergeron, 48 F. Supp. 2d 628 (M.D. La,
1999).
81 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
82 In 1935, the Court struck down wage and hour regulations that affected a business
the Court deemed indirectly related to interstate commerce. A.L. Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 550 (1935).
83 Congress's commerce power encompasses three broad categories of activity: (1)
the power to regulate the use of the channels of interstate commerce; (2) the power to
regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things In
interstate commerce; and (3) activities that "substantially affect" interstate commerce. Mor-
rison, 120 S. Ct. at 1749 (citing Lope, 514 U.S. at 558-59). This case involved the scope of
the third category.
[Vol. 86:109
UNITED STATES v. MORRISON
The Morrison Court analyzed the civil rights remedy under four
factors it identified in Lopem First, the Court concluded that gender-
motivated crime, like gun possession, was not an economic activity.84
The Court explained that prior Commerce Clause case law had up-
held regulation of intrastate activity only in cases in which the activity
was economic in nature.8 5 Although it declined to adopt a categorical
rule against aggregating the effects of noneconomic activity, by inter-
preting prior case law as a limit on Congress's power to aggregate the
effects of intrastate activity, the Court effectively created the categori-
cal rule it expressly disclaimed.
The Court then observed that the civil rights remedy contained
no jurisdictional element that would insure a sufficient link to inter-
state commerce in each case.8 6 In this respect, the Court distin-
guished the civil rights remedy from VAWA's criminal provisions,
which contain a jurisdictional element and have uniformly been up-
held against constitutional scrutiny.87
Next, the Court addressed the adequacy of the legislative find-
ings. In contrast to the Gun Free School Zones Act struck down in
Lopez, the Court found that the civil rights remedy was supported by
"numerous findings regarding the serious impact that gender-moti-
vated violence has on victims and their families."ss Nonetheless, the
Court stated that the existence of congressional findings was not suffi-
cient to sustain Commerce Clause legislation. It emphasized that the
ultimate power to determine a law's constitutionality rests with the
Court. Notably, the Court did not critique the findings that sup-
ported Congress's enactment of the civil rights remedy; it did not
deem irrational Congress's conclusion that gender-based violence sub-
stantially affected interstate commerce.8 9
Instead, the majority took issue with the "method of reasoning"
Congress used in enacting the lawOO However, the decision offers lit-
tle elaboration about how the majority identifies or categorizes that
"method." The Court did not describe its view of the flaws in Con-
gress's reasoning beyond stating that the reasoning "seeks to follow
the but-for causal chain from the initial occurrence of violent crime
... to every attenuated effect upon interstate commerce."91 Presuma-
84 Id. at 1751.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 1751-52 & n.5.
88 Id. at 1752.
89 Id. But cf. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 563 (1995) (asserting that no con-
gressional findings supported the Gun-Free School Zone Act's impact on interstate
commerce).
90 AMorrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1752.
91 Id.
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bly referencing the Lopez decision, the Court asserted that it had "al-
ready rejected as unworkable" the "but-for" method of reasoning
because the method would disturb the separation of powers between
the various branches of government. 92 The Court was concerned that
upholding the reasoning leading to the civil rights remedy would
"completely obliterate the Constitution's distinction between national
and local authority."9 3 The majority was particularly worried that up-
holding the civil rights remedy would authorize congressional legisla-
tion of any crime, which properly falls under the States' police power,
and would open the door to wholesale federal regulation of family
law.94
The Court acknowledged Congress's attempt to identify a proper
and limited role for federal legislation by expressly precluding litiga-
tion of traditional family law matters in VAWA civil rights remedy
cases.95 The statute's exclusion of the family law cases, which the
Court feared would creep into federal court under the auspices of
VAWA, should have satisfied the Court's concern about the statute's
potential overbreadth. But the Court found the statutory solution un-
persuasive and reemphasized that the Court, not Congress, was the
ultimate arbiter of a federal law's constitutionality.96
The Court concluded by rejecting Congress's regulation of
"noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that con-
duct's aggregate effect on interstate commerce."97 In its view,
noneconomic, violent criminal conduct was a classic example of an
area that should be reserved to the states under their police power.
Thus, when the Court struck down the law under Congress's com-
merce power, it effectively relied on the nature of the conduct it per-
ceived the statute to regulate.
Justice Thomas wrote a brief concurrence, expressing the posi-
tion that the majority decision did not go far enough.98 He took the
view that the Court should entirely eliminate the "substantial effects"
test, on which Congress relied in enacting the law under its Com-
merce Clause power.99 He argued that the test was inconsistent with
the Court's original understanding of the Constitution and that with-
out a more defined standard, Congress would continue to appropriate
state powers "under the guise of regulating commerce." 100
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 1753.
95 Id. (referencing 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (e) (4) (1995)).
96 Id.
97 Id at 1754.
98 Id. at 1759 (Thomas, J., concurring).
99 Id (Thomas, J., concurring).
100 Id. (Thomas, J, concurring).
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FourJustices dissented. Justice Souter wrote the principle dissent
that was joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer.10 1 This
opinion focused on the "mountain of data" on which Congress relied
in enacting the law. 102 Justice Souter recounted the voluminous legis-
lative record demonstrating the impact of gender-based violence on
the economy.103 He distinguished this case from those involing the
federalization of traditional state crimes, which Justice Souter has op-
posed, and argued that the legislative record here was more substan-
tial than that found sufficient in previous decisions upholding
commerce clause legislation.10 4 He questioned whether the Court was
abandoning the rational basis standard of review that it had tradition-
ally applied to Commerce Clause legislation, suggesting that the Court
was "supplanting rational basis scrutiny with a new criterion of re-
view."10 5 Justice Souter objected that the Court's newly articulated
standard for Congress's Commerce Clause power, based on the
"method of analysis" Congress used in deciding to regulate activities
that substantially affect commerce, had no support in the Court's case
law. He critiqued the majority's analysis of early decisions articulating
the respective roles of the Court and Congress, offering an alternative
view of the judicial/legislative balance. 0 6
Justice Souter took particular issue with the majority's resurrec-
tion of two previously rejected categorical approaches to analyzing
Congress's commerce power. first, a distinction based on whether the
conduct is economic or noneconomic and, second, whether the law
regulated a matter of traditional state concern. Justice Souter warned
that the Court's previous adherence to formalistic categories "in large
measure provoked the judicial crisis of 1937."107 He cautioned that
"today's decision can only be seen as a step toward recapturing the
prior mistakes." 08 The majority decision's inherent errors leftJustice
Souter "to doubt that the majority's view will prove to be enduring
law."' 0 9
Justice Breyer also wrote a dissent, whichJustice Stevens joined in
full andjustices Souter and Ginsburgjoined with respect to the Com-
merce Clause analysis." 0 In his analysis of the Commerce Clause, Jus-
101 Id. (SouterJ., dissenting).
102 I. at 1760 (SouterJ., dissenting).
103 Id. at 1760-63 (Souter, J., dissenting).
104 Id. at 1763 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) and Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964)).
105 Id. at 1764 (SouterJ., dissenting).
106 Id. at 1765-66 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing, for example, Gibbons v. Ogden, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) and THE FEDEmALST No. 45 (J. Madison)).
107 Morrisor 120 S. Ct. at 1767 (SouterJ., dissenting).
108 Id. (SouterJ., dissenting).
109 Id. at 1773 (SouterJ., dissenting).
11O Id. at 1774 (BreyerJ., dissenting).
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tice Breyer focused on the unworkable nature of the majority's
categorical "economic/noneconomic" distinction for assessing valid
Commerce Clause legislation."' He suggested that analyzing the ade-
quacy of the legislative process could assist courts in assessing whether
Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate noneconomic activity pre-
served federalism values while avoiding the categorical distinctions
previously found unworkable. In a section joined only by Justice Ste-
vensJustice Breyer additionally critiqued the majority's analysis under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.11 2
B. The Court's Section 5 Analysis
The Court's analysis of Section 5 rested on the authority of two
cases from 1883 and a bald determination that the civil rights remedy
did not remedy equal protection violations because it was directed at
individuals rather than state actors." 3 The Court first recognized that
VAWA's legislative record established that there was "pervasive bias in
various state justice systems against victims of gender-motivated vio-
lence."" 4 It cited evidence that state justice officials "perpetuat[e] an
array of erroneous stereotypes and assumptions," leading Congress to
conclude that "these discriminatory stereotypes often result in insuffi-
cient investigation and prosecution of gender-motivated crime, inap-
propriate focus on the behavior and credibility of the victims of that
crime, and unacceptably lenient punishments for those who are actu-
ally convicted."' 15
The Court's decision focused on whether Congress's Section 5
power could extend to the conduct of private individuals. The major-
ity rested on its interpretation of the Reconstruction-era cases, United
States v. Harris? 6 and the Civil Rights Cases,"7 which involved prede-
cessors to the current public accommodations law and the federal law
criminalizing conspiracies to deprive individuals' civil rights. The
Harris Court struck down the predecessor civil rights conspiracy law
on the grounds that it was "directed exclusively against the action of
private persons, without reference to the laws of the State, or their
administration by her officers."" 8 In the Civil Rights Cases, the Court
similarly invalidated the public accommodations statute because it ap-
111 Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
112 Id. at 1778-80 (Breyer, J., dissenting). For discussion of the majority's analysis
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, see infra Part II.B.
"1 Id. at 1755-59.
114 I. at 1755.
115 Id.
116 106 U.S. 629 (1883).
117 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
118 Harris, 106 U.S. at 640.
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plied to purely private conduct. 19 The Morrison Court interpreted
those cases to preclude Section 5 regulation of private conduct.
The Court rejected arguments challenging both the vitality and
the implications of those decisions. First, the vitality of both decisions
had been questioned in dicta in two subsequent cases, United States v.
Guest120 and District of Columbia v. Carter.'2' Although the issue was not
essential to the holding in either case, a plurality of the Court in Guest
and a unanimous Court in Carter reasoned that Congress's Section 5
authority can extend to regulation of private conduct as a means to
prevent state violations.122 Neither the Guest nor Carter decision inter-
preted the Reconstruction-era cases as precluding Section 5 regula-
tion of private conduct in appropriate circumstances. Nonetheless,
the Morrison Court flatly rejected the modem decisions' reasoning as
"naked dicta." 23 It reasserted that the Reconstruction-era cases con-
trolled the outcome of Morrison and justified their doctrinal force by
virtue of the "length of time they have been on the books." 124
The Court also rejected arguments distinguishing the record un-
derlying those Reconstruction-era cases from the record here. For ex-
ample, the Civil Rights Cases sets forth Congress's Section 5 power to
enact legislation that is "corrective in its character" and aimed to
"counteract and redress" unconstitutional state action.'- The Court
in both Harris and the Civil Rights Cases struck down the statutes at
issue because it concluded that they were not directed against state
violations. By contrast, the legislative history underlying the VAWA
civil rights remedy revealed that Congress expressly sought to remedy
equal protection violations.126 Specifically, after Congress found that
gender-based discrimination by state officials denied victims of gen-
der-based crimes access to judicial remedies, it sought to authorize a
cause of action that victims could pursue without having to rely on
those same officials.127 The Morrison Court did not address that argu-
ment. It went beyond the Court's conclusions in Harris and the Civil
Rights Cases that the statutes there were not remedial of state discrimi-
119 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 11.
120 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
121 409 U.S. 418 (1973) superseded by statute as stated in Best v. District of Columbia, 743
F. Supp. 44,46-47 (D.D.C. 1990). The decision in the Ciil Rights Cases is subject to further
critique because it rejected Congress's authority to enact the public accommodations law
under the Thirteenth Amendment as well, under which there should be no question that
Congress could reach private conduct. The Civil Rights Cases; 109 U.S. at 24-25.
122 Carter, 409 U.S. at 424 n.8; Guest, 383 U.S. at 759; id. at 762 (ClarkJ., concurring);
id. at 784 (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
123 United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740, 1757 (2000).
124 Id. at 1756.
125 Id. (citing The Civil Rights Cases; 109 U.S. at 18).
126 See supra Part I.B.
127 See id.
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nation and instead injected its own interpretation of the Reconstruc-
tion-era Congress's legislative intent. 128 The Morrison Court cited an
example from the Reconstruction-em statutes' legislative history not
discussed in Harris or the Civil Rights Cases to suggest that the Recon-
struction Congress intended to redress states' discriminatory imple-
mentation of the laws. 129  The Court's substitution of its own
historical account for the reasoning of the contemporaneous Court is
particularly disingenuous given the Morrison majority's purported reli-
ance on stare decisis in other parts of its reasoning.' 30
Notwithstanding that discussion of Harris and Guest, the Court de-
clined to determine whether the Reconstruction-era statute's legisla-
tive history was distinguishable from that of the civil rights remedy. In
addition, it never explained why legislation regulating individual con-
duct could not be corrective of state sponsored discrimination. In-
stead, the majority flatly concluded that the civil rights remedy was not
sufficiently corrective in nature because it was directed at the actions
of private individuals rather than state actors.13 '
In one final point, the Court noted that the civil rights remedy's
nationwide application was problematic because Congress had not
documented gender-based discriminatory practices in all states.' 32 It
contrasted the civil rights remedy with other Section 5 legislation,
such as voting rights laws, which were directed at particular jurisdic-
tions in which Congress had identified discriminatory policies of con-
stitutional magnitude.' 33 However, the Morrison Court's conclusion
about the extent to which Congress documented the problem of gen-
der bias misconstrues the nature of the congressional record. Con-
gress had not sought to undertake a nationwide study of the problem.
Nor does any precedent limit Congress to enacting Section 5 legisla-
tion that redresses a problem documented in all fifty states.'3 4
Justice Breyer's dissent took issue with the majority's Section 5
analysis, although only Justice Stevens joined this part of the dissent.
Justice Breyer "doubt[ed]" the Court's reasoning in interpreting Har-
ris and the Civil Rights Cases.'35 In his view, those cases involved laws
that the Court found were "directed exclusively" against state actors,
which was different'from the case here, because Congress sought to
128 Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1758.
129 Id. (discussing excerpt from legislative history of Reconstruction-era statutes that
was not referenced in Harris or the Civil Rights Cases).
130 See id. at 1756 (citing stare decisis as basis for relying on Harris and the Civil Rights
Cases).
131 Id. at 1755-59.
132 Id. at 1759.
133 Id. at 1758-59.
134 Id. at 1779 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
'35 Id. at 1778 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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redress discriminatory state action that left women without adequate
state remedies.13 6 Justice Breyer suggested that there is no reason to
preclude Congress from providing a remedy against private actors and
reasoned that such a law would not intrude unduly on states' author-
ity.137 He opined that this federal remedy could compel state actors
to improve their remedial responses and found no reason why the law
was "disproportionate" to the identified discriminatory practices.'-
Justice Breyer also pointed out the fallacy of the Court's conclusion
that there was no gender-bias problem in all fifty states, noting Con-
gress reported that at least twenty-one states had made findings of
gender-based discrimination in state legal systems and the absence of
similar findings in other states did not mean that those states were
free from bias.139
IV
TiE CouRT's FAiLURE TO ANALYZE CrviL RIGHTs LEGisLATiON
The Morrison decision has been the subject of criticism and con-
cern about both its implications for federal civil rights laws and its
apparent return to a previously-rejected and unworkable categorical
formulation of the commerce power.1 40 The decision purports to be
respectful of federalism and the limited nature of federal legislative
power with respect to that of the states. 141 In at least one important
respect, however, the decision is not consistent with the principle of
limited federal power it endorsed. The Court ignored arguments,
fully supported by the legislative record, that Congress sought to regu-
late a matter of civil rights, an area in which the federal government
136 Id. at 1779 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629,
640 (1883)).
137 Id. (BreyerJ., dissenting).
138 Id. (BreyerJ., dissenting).
139 Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting)
140 Mauro & Ringel, supra note 5, at 1; see also, eg., Lyle Denniston, 1omen Can't Sue
Rapists, Court Says; BAIT. SUN, May 16, 2000, at Al; Jan Crawford Greenburg, High Court
Ruling Further Clips the Role of Congress, Cmi. TR BUNE, May 15, 2000, § 1, at 1; Linda Green-
house, Battle on Federalism, N.Y. Twtsrs, May 16, 2000, at A18; Greenhouse, sipra note 4, at
Al; LongShadow of Gender Crimes, LA Tims, May 19, 2000, at B8; Vioklce Against the Consti-
tution, N.Y. Timzs, May 16, 2000, at A22. Among oilier grounds on which tie majority
decision could be criticized is its implicit rejection of the traditional rational basis standard
for reviewing the adequacy of Congress's assessment of whether a law is constitutional com-
merce clause legislation. The Court rested on a rejection of the "method of reasoning'
employed to uphold the law. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1752. AsJustice Sourer stated, this crite-
rion is without precedent and supplants the traditional rational basis scrutiny. Id. at 1765
(Souter, J., dissenting). This repudiation of that time-honored approach is particularly
ironic in light of the Court's insistence on the force of stare detisis in supporting its Section
5 analysis. Id. at 1756. The Court's reasoning casts doubt on the scope of permissible
congressional action under the Commerce Clause, leaving legislators without adequate
guidance in devising future legislation.
141 See Morison, 120 S. Ct. at 1752-54.
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has a strong historic and enduring interest. While the decision is un-
doubtedly vulnerable to criticism from a variety of perspectives, the
Court's wholesale omission of the civil rights nature of the conduct
Congress sought to regulate warrants careful review.1 42
A fundamental mischaracterization of the conduct regulated
under the civil rights remedy premised the Court's Commerce Clause
analysis. Throughout the opinion, the Court referred to the "crimi-
nal" nature of the conduct at issue.143 While the civil rights remedy
covered conduct that was undoubtedly criminal in nature, Congress
made plain its intent to provide redress for acts of discrimination that
violated the victims' civil rights. For example, the statute's plain lan-
guage requires proof of discriminatory motivation in each case, specif-
ically stating that the act was committed "because of gender or on the
basis of gender, and due, at least in part, to an animus based on the
victim's gender."144 In answer to questions about how the law would
be interpreted, Congress explicitly directed courts to other federal an-
tidiscrimination laws for examples of how to assess whether the defen-
dant's conduct was gender-motivated. 145 The statutory requirement
that plaintiffs assert proof of discriminatory conduct in each case en-
sures that the law covers a limited category of conduct that is different
in nature from all violent crime or all family law. Nowhere does the
Court recognize that distinction.
The Court's concerns about the implications of upholding the
VAWA civil rights remedy are simply inapplicable when the statute is
viewed as a civil rights law. For example, in critiquing the "method of
reasoning" Congress employed in enacting the law, the Court worried
that upholding the VAWA civil rights remedy would open the door to
federal regulation of "murder or any other type of violence" for which
a national economic impact could undoubtedly be demonstrated.14 6
The Court expressed a similar concern that the law would open the
door to federal legislation of family law matters, brushing aside with
virtually no analysis Congress's careful drafting to exclude family law
matters from VAWA civil rights remedy cases. 147 These concerns re-
142 Justice Breyer's dissent suggests an additional approach through which the Court
could have upheld the law consistent with its concern and respect for "federalism" values,
Citing commentators who have analyzed the dilemmas posed by the expanding national
economy and concerns about overreaching federal legislation, Justice Breyer suggested
that the Court look to the thoroughness of the legislative process in assessing the validity of
any particular Congressional action. Id. at 1778 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
143 E.g., id. at 1748, 1754, 1758.
144 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (d) (1) (1994).
145 Supra note 32 (explaining Congress's analogy of the civil rights remedy to other
civil rights laws); see also Goldscheid, supra note 30, at 130 (noting that the wording of the
civil rights remedy "directly tracks" statutory language of other civil rights legislation).
146 Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1753.
147 See id. The Court stated:
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flect the majority's presumption that the civil rights remedy was a stat-
ute of general jurisdiction regulating an area of traditional state
concern, like criminal or family law. In fact, the law covers a much
narrower subset of conduct-acts of violence for which gender-based
discriminatory motive can be proved.148
By ignoring that argument, the Court failed to distinguish prior
caselaw recognizing the distinction between civil rights legislation and
general tort law. In Griffin v. Breckenridge,49 the Court considered
whether 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), the Reconstruction-era civil rights stat-
ute that prohibited conspiracies, could apply to acts of private individ-
uals. °50 The Court upheld the statute's reach to private conspiracies
and reasoned that the law would not apply to all tortious, conspirato-
rial interferences with others' rights.15' Instead, it reasoned:
The constitutional shoals that would lie in the path of interpreting
§ 1985(3) as a general federal tort law can be avoided by giving full
effect to the congressional purpose-by requiring, as an element of
the cause of action, the kind of invidiously discriminatory motiva-
tion stressed by the sponsors of the [statute]. 152
The Court further explained that the statute wvas suitable federal legis-
lation provided that it redressed discrimination:
The language requiring intent to deprive of equal protection, or
equal privileges and immunities, means that there must be some ra-
cial, or perhaps othenise class-based, invidiously discriminatory ani-
mus behind the conspirators' action. The conspiracy, in other
words, must aim at a deprivation of the equal enjoyment of rights
secured by the law to all.153
The Morrison Court refused to recognize the same distinction without
offering a principled basis for rejecting the analogy.
Moreover, the Morrison Court ignored the traditional national in-
terest in the uniform enforcement of civil rights. 5' For example, in
Petitioners' reasoning, moreover, will not limit Congress to regulating %io-
lence but may, as we suggested in Lopez, be applied equally as well to family
law and other areas of traditional state regulation .... Congress may have
recognized this specter when it expressly precluded § 13981 from being
used in the family law context .... [H]owever, the limitation of congres-
sional authority is not solely a matter of legislative grace.
Id.
148 42 U.S.C. § 13981(d) (1).
149 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
150 Id. at 102.
'15 I&
152 Id. (citations omitted).
153 I& (citations omitted).
154 While the Court purported to reject categorical distinctions based on the t)pe of
conduct the statute regulates, it was undoubtedly animated by the concern about respect-
ing a principled distinction between federal and state legislative authority. Justice Souter
asserted that the majority resurrected the previously rejected approach to Commerce
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Wisconsin v. Mitchell,1 5 5 the Court, in an opinion by ChiefJustice Rehn-
quist, unanimously upheld against a First Amendment challenge the
constitutionality of Wisconsin's statute authorizing enhanced sentenc-
ing for bias-inspired conduct. 156 In reaching that result, the Court
recognized that bias-motivated conduct "is thought to inflict greater
individual and societal harm" than other crimes.'5 7 The Court ac-
knowledged that bias-motivated crimes have a distinct impact on their
victims and on the community at large, noting that they "are more
likely to provoke retaliatory crimes, inflict distinct emotional harms
on their victims, and incite community unrest."'u5 Quoting Black-
stone, the Court determined it is "reasonable" to punish these crimes
more severely because they are "'the most destructive of the public
safety and happiness.'"'159 Similarly, in her dissenting opinion in Bray
v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, Justice O'Connor recognized that
the federal interest in vindicating violence perpetrated against individ-
uals because of their class membership implicated distinct federal in-
terests that warranted federal civil rights redress. 160
The Morrison Court's silence about the civil rights nature of the
civil rights remedy is particularly striking in light of the Court's previ-
ous recognition that federal legislation may be needed to redress dis-
criminatory conduct by the states.161 In enacting the civil rights
remedy, Congress similarly responded to the national interest in en-
forcing a uniform standard for civil rights protections. 162
The Court's refusal to recognize the federal interest in civil rights
legislation is also inconsistent with other previous rulings. The Court
power that rested on whether a federal law covers an area of "traditional state concern."
United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740, 1768-69 (2000) (SouterJ., dissenting). Even if
the Morrison Court has effectively resurrected this principle, the civil rights remedy should
survive review because, unlike federal murder or general family law provisions, it regulates
civil rights, which is not an area of traditional exclusive state concern.
155 508 U.S. 476 (1993).
156 Id. at 483-90.
157 Id. at 487-88.
158 Id. at 488.
159 Id (citing 4 WxtIum BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *16).
160 Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263,348 (1993) (O'ConnorJ.,
dissenting).
161 E.g., Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 722 (1989) (discussing federal
civil rights laws as responsive to local, uncurbed, discriminatory violence in the southern
states); Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 505-06 (1982) (recounting Congress's enact-
ment of Reconstruction-era civil rights statutes in response to state law enforcement's fail-
ure to enforce civil rights laws); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 174 (1961) (describing
Congress's enactment of Reconstruction-era civil rights statutes in response to southern
states' inability to curb discriminatory violence), overruled by Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs.,
436 U.S. 658, 665 (1978).
162 E.g., S. REP. No. 103-138, at 44 (1993) ("State remedies are inadequate to fight bias
crimes against women.. . ."); id. at 55 (noting that the civil rights remedy "provides a
necessary remedy to fill the gaps and rectify the biases of existing State laws").
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has recognized the national interest in providing uniform federal re-
dress for the national economic impact of private racial discrimina-
tion.163 The Court does not distinguish the legislative record here
from that supporting the 1964 public accommodations laws, which
were upheld based on the federal interest in redressing analogous evi-
dence of the aggregate effect of private racial discrimination on the
economy.'64
The parallels between the legislative records underlying the civil
rights remedy and the public accommodations laws are striking- both
highlight Congress's concern with the impact of discrimination on
travel, consumer spending, and the overall restriction on market activ-
ity. AsJustice Souter pointed out, the record shows that gender-based
violence, like racial discrimination, bars its targets from full participa-
tion in the economy.165 For example, in Heart of Atlanta, the Court
upheld the statute's prohibition of discrimination in public accommo-
dations because the legislative record was "replete with evidence of
the burdens that discrimination by race or color places upon inter-
state commerce."166 Recognizing race discrimination as a "nation-
wide" problem, the Court relied on its "effect of discouraging travel
on the part of a substantial portion of the Negro community." 6 7 The
Court was concerned about the "disruptive effect" of racial discrinina-
tion on "commercial intercourse" 168 and identified the object of the
legislation as vindicating the "deprivation of personal dignity" that ac-
companies discrimination. 169
Similarly, in Katzenbach v. McClung, the Court recognized that the
legislative record was "replete with testimony of the burdens placed
on interstate commerce by racial discrimination in restaurants."170
The record specifically documented the "direct and highly restrictive
effect" of discrimination on interstate travel by African Americans. 171
Congress had documented that discrimination depressed consumer
spending in areas where discrimination was widely practiced.172 It fur-
ther documented that "discrimination deterred professional, as well as
skilled, people from moving into areas where such practices occurred
and thereby caused industry to be reluctant to establish there."173
163 Eg., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v.
United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
164 E.g., McClung, 379 U.S. at 300; Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 260-61.
165 United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740, 1763 (2000) (Souter,J., dissenting).
166 Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 252.
167 Id. at 253.
168 IR at 257.
169 Id. at 250.
170 Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 299 (1964).
171 I& at 300.
172 Id,
173 Id,
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The VAWA civil rights remedy's legislative history shows that Con-
gress was similarly responding to the effect of discriminatory gender-
based violence on women's full participation in commerce. For exam-
ple, Congress documented that gender-based violence deters women's
movement, keeping them from walking at night, even in their own
neighborhoods; restricting their use of public transportation; and lim-
iting where and when they will travel. 174 Congress also documented
the way gender-based violence reduces consumer spending, finding,
for example, that women would not go to the movies alone after
dark.175 Like the impact of race discrimination on African Americans'
choice ofjobs, Congress documented that gender-based violence de-
ters women from taking jobs in certain areas or at certain hours. 170
Overall, it concluded that gender-based crimes and fear of those
crimes "restricts movement, reduces employment opportunities, and
reduces consumer spending."177
As Justice Souter pointed out, the VAWA legislative record was
more voluminous than the record supporting the 1964 civil rights law,
and it revealed that gender-motivated violence operated in a manner
quite similar to that of race discrimination in the 1960s.178 Although
racial discrimination in hotels, restaurants, and other public accom-
modations could be viewed as more inherently economic than gen-
der-based violence, the Heart of Atlanta and McClung decisions reveal
that the Court was concerned with the impact of private discrimina-
tion on the economy, not on whether the conduct itself was economic
or non-economic. In addition, it is quite possible that, in the 1960s,
the Court viewed race discrimination as a private, local concern, much
like how the Morrison Court viewed discriminatory gender-based vio-
lence as private. 179
Viewing the civil rights remedy in the context of other federal
civil rights legislation, the Court's conclusion that upholding the law
would eliminate the distinction between national and local authority
seems particularly misplaced. Like laws such as Title VII, or 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 or § 1985(3), the civil rights remedy provides redress for con-
174 S. REP. No. 102-197, at 38-39 (1991).
175 Id. at 38.
176 S. REP. No. 103-138, at 54 (1993).
177 S. REP. No. 101-545, at 43 (1990).
178 United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740, 1763-64 (2000) (SouterJ., dissenting).
179 Much has been written about the long-standing belief that violence against womcn,
particularly domestic violence committed by intimates, is a private matter, not to be treated
in the public arena of the justice system. See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Violence of
P ivacy, in THE PuBuc NATURi OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE 36 (Martha A. Fineman & Roxanne
Mykitiuk eds., 1994); Amy Eppler, Note, Battered Women and the Equal Protection Clautse: Will
the Constitution Help Them When the Police Won't, 95 YALE LJ. 788, 791 (1986) ("The police
non-arrest policy is most commonly justified by a belief in 'family privacy,' a doctrine dic-
tating that the state should not intervene in domestic matters.").
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duct that could be, and in many instances is, covered under state as
well as federal law. For example, Title VII, in its coverage of sexual
harassment claims, may redress harms flowing from conduct that
could be the subject of assault or battery charges under state civil or
criminal laws.180 Similarly, cases brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or
§1985 (3), based on claims of sexual assaults by state actors or racially
motivated violence, may include supplemental state tort claims.' 8 ' As
Justice Ginsburg suggested at oral argument, state tort claims could
supplement VAWA civil rights claims in the same manner as these
other civil rights schemes. 8 2 The Constitution permits the federal
government to exercise concurrent jurisdiction in areas that are of
both national and local concern. 83 The majority opinion does not
mention-never mind refute-the national interest in redressing the
civil rights violation Congress identified as beyond the states' power to
successfully address alone. Nor does it explain why the law should not
be viewed as a model of cooperative federalism, a principle the Court
previously has endorsed.184
In its Commerce Clause analysis, the majority's stated concern
with limiting Commerce Clause legislation to conduct suited for fed-
eral intervention rings hollow when one considers Congress's attempt
to redress civil rights violations through the VAWA civil rights remedy.
The Court does not reconcile this tension.
V
IMPLIATIONS FOR FuTuRE RnFoRRs
The Morrison Court recognized both the economic impact of gen-
der-based violence and the historic discrimination that precluded wo-
men from obtaining effective redress for acts of gender-motivated
violence. Nonetheless, it found Congress's statutory formulation con-
stitutionally infirm. Attempts to respond to the decision include new
legislation that would avoid the elements that proved fatal in Morrison.
180 See, e.g., Swentek v. USAIR, Inc., 830 F.2d 552 (4th Cir. 1987) (alleging claims of
sexual harassment, assault and battery, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress).
181 Se; eg., Haberthurv. City of Raymore, 119 F.3d 720 (8th Cir. 1997) (alleging claim
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as well as claims of battery and intentional infliction of emotional
distress).
182 Transcript of Oral Arguments, at *8-9, Aforrison (Nos. 99-5, 99-29), available at 2000
U.S. Trans. LEXIS 22.
183 EKg., Gregoryv. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991) ("Congress may legislate in areas
traditionally regulated by the states.").
184 Eg., Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 289 (1981)
(upholding statute providing for cooperative federalism); cf FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S.
742, 783 n.12 (1982) (O'ConnorJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (A federal
system implies a partnership, all members of which are effective players on the team and
all of whom retain the capacity for independent action." (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted)).
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The Morrison decision leaves open several approaches to statutory
reform that could reinstate federal civil rights redress for gender-moti-
vated violence, albeit with a more limited reach. First, the Court
noted that the civil rights remedy contained no jurisdictional element
that would ensure an appropriate link with interstate commerce in
each instance.' 8 5 As Justice Breyer's dissent recognized, Congress ap-
parently could rewrite the law consistent with the majority's decision
and limit its application to commercial venues such as "restaurants,
hotels, perhaps universities, and other places of public accommoda-
tion."' 8 6 Jurisdictional elements could be modeled after other federal
laws, including the VAWA felonies, which limit federal coverage to
cases involving interstate activity. 187 Other jurisdictional elements
that have withstood constitutional challenge require proof of an eco-
nomic nexus in each instance. 188 A revised civil rights remedy that
includes a similar jurisdictional element would undoubtedly limit the
number of women who could seek redress but would provide a rem-
edy that is constitutionally sound even under the majority's reasoning.
Other potential statutory approaches could respond to the deci-
sion's Section 5 analysis, although any resulting remedy likely would
be extremely limited in scope. For example, the Morrison Court recog-
nized that Congress enacted the civil rights remedy in response to a
record of discriminatory state enforcement of gender-based crimes,
but struck down the statute because it was not directed toward state
actors. Subsequent legislation could authorize federal intervention in
instances of discriminatory responses by local officials. Existing fed-
eral laws provide models for such an approach. For example, the At-
torney General has ,discretionary authority under the Institutionalized
Persons Act to bring a civil action against any state institution to re-
dress practices that deprive people in state institutions of their civil
185 Mortison, 120 S. Ct. at 1751.
186 Id. at 1775 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
187 E.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 2261, 2262 (1994) (criminalizing interstate domestic violence
and interstate violation of protective orders); see also Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1752 & n,5
(recognizing that interstate domestic violence statute has been uniformly upheld as within
Congress's Commerce Clause authority to regulate the channels of interstate commerce).
188 E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 247 (1994) (criminalizing intentional destruction of religious
property or obstruction of individual's exercise of religious belief in circumstances that are
"in or affect[ ] interstate or foreign commerce); Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (1994)
(criminalizing robbery or extortion that "in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects
commerce"); United States v. Jennings, 195 F.3d 795 (5th Cir. 1999) (upholding Hobbs
Act's constitutionality), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 2694 (2000); see also Local Law Enforcement
Enhancement Act of 2000, S. 2550, 106th Cong. (2000) (proposing amendment to 18
U.S.C. § 245 to criminalize hate crimes based on gender, sexual orientation, or disability
provided that, for each offense, either the defendant or the victim traveled in interstate
commerce, used an instrumentality of interstate commerce, or that the conduct "interferes
with commercial or other economic activity in which the victim is engaged at the time of
the conduct; or otherwise affects interstate or foreign commerce").
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rights. 8 9 Similarly, the Voting Rights Act authorizes the Attorney
General to take action upon evidence of discriminatory voter registra-
tion practices. 190
OnJuly 27, 2000 Representative Conyers introduced a bill, House
Bill 5021, that retains the essential elements of the 1994 VAWA civil
rights remedy yet responds to the Morrison decision.19' It includes
both ajurisdictional element requiring a commercial link in each case
and the authority for Department ofJustice intervention upon a show-
ing that local authorities discriminated based on gender in their re-
sponse to gender-based crimes. Specifically, the proposal requires
proof that
(1) in connection with the offense-
(A) the defendant or the victim travels in interstate or foreign
commerce;
(B) the defendant or the victim uses a facility or instrumental-
ity of interstate or foreign commerce; or
(C) the defendant employs a firearm, explosive, incendiary de-
vice, or other weapon, or a narcotic or drug listed pursuant
to section 202 of the Controlled Substances Act, or other
noxious or dangerous substance, that has traveled in inter-
state or foreign commerce;
(2) the offense interferes with commercial or other economic activ-
ity in which the victim is engaged at the time of the conduct; or
(3) the offense was committed with intent to interfere ith the vic-
tim's commercial or other economic activity.192
In addition, the law authorizes the Attorney General to investigate and
bring a civil action for equitable relief if she has "reasonable cause" to
believe that the state or locality has "discriminated on the basis of gen-
der in the investigation or prosecution of gender-based crimes," pro-
vided that the discrimination is part of a pattern or practice of
"resistance to investigating or prosecuting" such crimes.193
In additional to the federal response, several states have intro-
duced versions of the 1994 civil rights remedy that would authorize
virtually the same cause of action in state court, although none have
been enacted as of the date of this writing. 94 Of course, all states
have some form of tort recovery that is available to victims of gender-
189 See 42 U.S.C. § 1997a (1994).
190 See § 1973b(b). The Monison Court discussed similar targeted remedies with ap-
proval. Morison, 120 S. Ct. at 1759.
191 Violence Against Women Civil Rights Restoration Act of 2000, H.R. 5021, 106th
Cong. (2000).
192 1& § 2.
193 Id.
194 E.g., S. 1535, 44th Leg., 2d Sess. (Ariz. 2000); H.R. 4407, 91st Leg. Sess. (I1. 2000);
S. 7903, 223d Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 1999).
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based crime.19 5 However, as Congress found when it determined that
state remedies were inadequate, recovery may be curtailed by restric-
tive statutes of limitations, the absence of rape shield protections in
state evidence codes, and other procedural obstacles. 196 In addition,
state remedies offer no relief for women whose claims are limited by
local bias, for example, in cases in which the perpetrator is familiar
with the local law enforcement officials.' 97
Other federal proposals would provide alternative responses to
gender-based violence that avoid the infirmities found in the civil
rights remedy. For example, proposed legislation directly aims to re-
move the economic barriers that gender-based violence creates. Title
VII of the proposed 1999 Violence Against Women Act seeks to ad-
vance women's employment opportunities in the face of violence. For
example, it contains provisions that would enable women to obtain
time off from work to address domestic violence, sexual assault, or
stalking.198 Another provision would enable women who have had to
leave their jobs due to domestic violence to obtain unemployment
benefits.199 Another would prohibit employers from discriminating
against domestic violence, sexual assault, or stalking victims simply be-
cause of their status as survivors of those crimes. 200 Each of these pro-
visions seeks to remedy the direct economic consequences gender-
based violence inflicts on women's lives.
CONCLUSION
All of these responses indicate that there is a continued need for
federal statutory redress for damages resulting from gender-based
crimes. New remedies may fare better than the civil rights remedy as
the constitutional debate over the respective roles of federal and state
authority continues. The Court reviewed the civil rights remedy dur-
ing a period of an ideological shift away from federal legislative au-
thority. But this current trend has not always prevailed and may not
195 See generally KARP & KARP, supra note 31, §§ 1.01-1.44 (discussing civil legal remedies
for spousal abuse).
196 E.g., 1993 Crimes of Violence Hearing supra note 15, at 8-9 (statement of Sally Gold-
farb); 1990 Women and Violence Hearing, supra note 15, at 58-59, 64 (statement of Helen
Neuborne); S. REP. No. 101-545, at 41 (1990); S. REP. No. 102-197, at 46, 54 (1981).
197 E.g., 1993 Volent Crimes Hearing; supra note 15, at 61 (statement of Barbara Wood)
(recounting that local officials in a rural communities "frequently know the perpetrators
and/or are related to them" and take the accused "out for coffee" instead of addressing
the violence); see also, e.g., Soto v. Flores, 103 F3d 1056 (1st Cir. 1997) (recounting a police
officer's handling of a domestic violence complaint in which he was acquainted with the
perpetrator).
198 Battered Women's Economic Security and Safety Act, S. 1069, 106th Cong, §§ 2044-
48 (1999); Violence Against Women Act of 1999, H.R 357, 106th Cong., §§ 744-748
(1999).
199 S. 1069, § 2043; H.R. 357, § 743.
200 S. 1069, §§ 2021-2026; H.R. 357, §§ 721-726.
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prove enduring. For example, in his 1985 dissent in Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,20 1 the case in which the Court
overturned National League of Cities v. UseriP 0 2 and held that the mini-
mum-wage and overtime requirements of the Fair Labor Standards
Act applied to a public mass-transit authority, ChiefJustice Rehnquist
wrote that he was confident that the then-overturned deference to
state autonomy would "in time again command the support of a ma-
jority of this Court."2 03 The Morrison decision, following a line of re-
cent decisions curtailing federal authority, signals that Chief Justice
Rehnquist's prediction has come to fruition. With the federalism
scale now tipped in the other direction, the words of Justice Souter's
dissent, doubting that "the majority's view will prove to be enduring
law," now echo ChiefJustice Rehnquist's earlier prediction.2 4
The debate is far from over. The Court may have scaled back the
scope of permissible federal legislation, but nowhere does it dispute
that gender-based violence is a form of discrimination that can violate
the victim's civil rights. While gender-based violence still takes an
enormous toll on women's lives and on the nation's economic secur-
ity, we cannot afford to lessen our commitment to take every step pos-
sible to ensure safety and equality for all.
201 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
202 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
203 Garcia, 469 U.S. at 580 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
204 United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740, 1773 (2000) (Souer, J., dissenting).
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